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Abstract. One of the concerns that comes with the use of RFID tags is
that these respond to any query. This can be overcome by having mu-
tual authentication between reader and tag. However, the ordering be-
tween the two authentication steps is crucial. In this paper, we formalise
mutual RFID authentication: capturing the necessary coupling between
tag authentication and reader authentication as well as the ordering be-
tween these authentication steps. We show that the reader needs to au-
thenticate first to the yet unknown tag to 1) preserve the tag’s privacy,
2) make it more resistant to side-channel analysis and 3) ensure that
the end-user can observe the protocol’s output. We propose a generic
construction to transform existing private RFID authentication proto-
cols into proper private RFID mutual authentication protocols. Finally,
we design a very efficient wide-strong private RFID mutual authentica-
tion protocol that requires the tag to compute only three scalar-elliptic
curve point multiplications. We also show how this new protocol can be
implemented efficiently in hardware.
1. Introduction
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) tags are already deployed in various con-
sumer applications such as physical access tokens, car keys, contactless payment
systems and electronic passports. Crucial for these applications is that the under-
lying protocols provide secure identification of the tag, and hence the supposed
user. Also the (location) privacy (see Weis et al. [19]) of the end user needs pro-
tection, meaning that unauthorised parties should not be able to identify, trace
or link tag appearances. Yet, all communication with RFID tags can easily be
eavesdropped or modified and it has been shown that side-channel attacks may
enable an adversary to extract secrets from the tag [9,10,16,13]. Additionally an
adversary can typically learn the outcome of the identification protocol: success-
ful identifications result in an unlocked door, unlocked car or processed payment;
while failure has no outcome. One of the limitations of RFID tags is that these
come without or with a very limited user-interface. This limitation is overcome
by having a tag respond to any query made to it. Although this solution is ideal
in terms of usability as no user interaction is required, it also makes tags even
more vulnerable to attacks.
By requiring mutual authentication in which the reader authenticates first
(called ‘reader-first’ further on), the potential of RFID attacks is greatly reduced:
tags will only respond to authorised queries that originate from a known reader.
First, attackers cannot send any special structured query to the RFID tag under
attack. Second, it is harder to mount side channel attacks since the only compu-
tations that could leak information about the secret happen only after successful
reader authentication. In other words, an adversary will have to interact with
both a reader and tag simultaneously to achieve reader authentication on the tag
side. This means that the adversary’s possibilities to interfere with the protocol
become more limited. By disrupting the protocol, reader authentication could fail
and the tag could abort the protocol before releasing any identifying information.
Third, while most RFID tags (even smart cards) have no or very limited user
interface, the reader usually has some output user interface. As such, by observing
the reader’s output, the end-user can assess whether or not the protocol between
his tag and the genuine reader terminated correctly.
Our goal is to provide an efficient protocol in which the tag will only respond
with identifiable information to authorised queries from known readers. This im-
plies that the reader first needs to authenticate its query to the yet-unknown
tag. Because the tag’s identitity is unknown, the reader cannot authenticate ef-
ficiently to the tag using a shared secret between the tag and the reader. This
means that public key based cryptographic techniques are necessary to reach our
goal. Lee et al. [11] and Hein et al. [6] showed that public key cryptography, in
particular Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), can be realized on RFID tags.
In terms of effiency, the effort required from the tag should be minized and the
available circuit area on the tag should be used optimally. Ideally, no additional
cryptographic building blocks, e.g., hash function or block ciphers are needed.
The paper is structured as follows: in Sect. 2 we give an overview of related
work and show the importance of ‘reader-first’ as opposed to ‘tag-first’ mutual
authentication. Section 3 explicitly defines mutual authentication as the reader
first authenticating to the yet-unknown tag, the tag authenticating to the reader
and the coupling between them. In Sect. 4, we show how to transform existing
private RFID authentication protocols into private RFID mutual authentication
protocols using our generic construction. Furthermore, we propose a new protocol,
named IBIHOP in Sect. 5. This protocol is very efficient since it only requires three
scalar-EC point multiplications. Finally, in Sect. 6 we show how to implement
this protocol efficiently in hardware.
2. Related Work
2.1. Model
Paise and Vaudenay [15] proposed the only existing private RFID mutual au-
thentication model, which is an extension of Vaudenay’s private RFID authen-
tication model [18]. The motivation for this work is to overcome the users’ con-
cerns of RFID tags responding to any query, by requiring that “a tag must be
confident of the reader’s identity before sending any information or its ID”. Even
though this paper claims to provide a formalisation of mutual authentication in
the RFID setting, it does not. Our critique is twofold: first the security definition
(see Def. 1) does not cover mutual authentication, and second the issue of RFID
tags responding to unauthorised queries is not covered by it.
Definition 1 (Security (from Paise-Vaudenay [15])). A scheme provides security
if it provides secure tag authentication and secure reader authentication.
This definition does not capture that these two uni-lateral authentications
steps need to be bound together, which is a necessary condition for mutual au-
thentication. Additionally, this definition does not impose an ordering on tag
authentication and reader authentication.
To address mutual authentication, the definition of an RFID system from [18]
is adapted such that the tag (and no longer the reader) outputs whether or not the
protocol was successful. This indicates that tag authentication precedes reader
authentication in this model. Towards completeness, an additional oracle to also
learn the result from the reader should be defined since in several use cases the
adversary also learns whether or not the reader accepted the tag (e.g., unlocked
door, processed payment).
Armknecht et al. [2] (and in consecutive work by Armknecht et al. [1]) also
pointed out some issues of this model with regard to the blinder. To some extent
these issues are also applicable to the underlying Vaudenay privacy model [18].
2.2. Protocols
Most proposed RFID mutual authentication protocols in literature are of the tag-
first class. When discussing protocols, it is important to also look at their intended
use. For instance, when the goal of mutual authentication is merely to establish
a secure connection to exchange data privately, the order of authentication is not
important. We will now discuss some classes of reader-first and tag-first RFID
mutual authentication protocols.
2.2.1. Reader-first
When the reader authenticates first to the tag, tag privacy might be enhanced. A
good example is the class of private search protocols [20], sometimes also referred
to as private interrogation protocols [4]. In these protocols, the reader wants to
know if a certain RFID tag is in the neighbourhood in a privacy-preserving way.
These protocols are designed such that only the target RFID responds. Having
the server first authenticate to the tag prevents adversaries from tracing tags.
However, these protocols only provide mutual authentication for one specific tag
and do not consider the more general setting, where the reader needs to prove its
identity to a non-designated verifier.
Another application of reader-first mutual authentication is the construction
of RFID tags that are only to be used for a limited number of authentication
instances, by only storing this number of coupons. Without reader-first mutual
authentication, an adversary can mount a very simple denial of service attack, by
depleting the available coupons.
2.2.2. Tag-first
Tag-first can provide stonger security guarantees for private RFID authentication
protocols that rely on the tag and server to keep a synchronised state, which is
updated after every instance of the authentication protocol. The tag will update
his state and send some information allowing the server to compute the same
state. To avoid desynchronisation attacks, the server first confirms the new state
to the tag (and as a consequence, implicitly authenticates to the tag), before the
tag updates its state.
Paise and Vaudenay [15] also proposed a couple of enriched existing private
RFID authentication protocols to achieve mutual authentication, i.e. with an ex-
tra message at the end authenticating the reader. However, this does not resolve
the issue of a tag giving out identifying information before it is confident of the
reader’s identity. Towards privacy, adversaries possibly learn additional informa-
tion from the final message from the reader to the tag (also for adversaries that
do not learn whether or not the tag was accepted by the reader) and from the
tag’s result. We can conclude that the proposed private RFID mutual authenti-
cation protocols require additional effort from the RFID tag and do not result in
stronger security or privacy guarantees when the goal is merely authentication.
3. Defininitions
3.1. Privacy
Vaudenay [18] proposed the first general RFID privacy model. However, several
issues with the blinder (discussed in Sect. 2) together with the fact that the
strongest privacy guarantee is unreachable in this model, makes that we switched
to the RFID privacy model of Hermans et al. [7]. This model is a robust general
RFID privacy model based on indistinguishability, which makes it easier to apply.
The intuition behind the RFID privacy model of Hermans et al. is that privacy is
guaranteed if an adversary cannot distinguish with which one of two RFID tags
(of its choosing), he is interacting through a set of oracles.
Privacy is defined as a distinguishability game (or experiment) between a
challenger and the adversary. This game is defined as follows. First, the challenger
picks a random challenge bit and then sets up the system. Next, the adversary
A can use a subset (depending on the privacy notion) of the system oracles to
interact with the system. Finally, A outputs its guess for the challenge bit. We
refer the reader to [7] for the formal definition of these oracles.
For the purpose of this paper we redefine the Corrupt oracle to only return
the non-volatile state of the tag. This restriction allows to exclude trivial privacy
attacks on mutual authentication protocols (more in general on all multi-pass
protocols). These protocols require that some information is stored in the tag’s
volatile memory during the protocol run.
Protocols can be classified according to the privacy notion they achieve. The
privacy notions used here, were originally introduced by Vaudenay [18]. Strong
attackers are allowed to use all available oracles. Forward attackers can only do
other corruptions after the first corruption, protocol interactions are no longer
allowed.Weak attackers cannot corrupt tags. Independently of these classes, there
is the notion of wide and narrow attackers. A wide attacker is allowed to get the
result from the reader, i.e. whether the identification was successful or not; while
a narrow attacker does not. The privacy notions are related as follows:
Wide-Strong ⇒ Wide-Forward ⇒ Wide-Weak
⇓ ⇓ ⇓
Narrow-Strong⇒ Narrow-Forward⇒ Narrow-Weak .
3.2. Security
First we define tag-authentication, for which the RFID tag authenticates to the
RFID reader. We use Definition 4 from [18] which is built upon the concept of
matching conversations.
Definition 2 (Tag-authentication). We consider any adversary in the class Strong.
We say the adversary wins if at least one protocol instance π on the reader iden-
tified an uncorrupted legitimate tag ID but π and ID did not have any matching
conversation, i.e. they exchanged well interleaved and faithfully (but maybe with
some time delay) transmitted messages until π completed. We call ID a target tag
and π a target instance. We say that the RFID scheme is secure if the success
probability of any such adversary is negligible.
Similarly, reader-authentication is defined as a matching conversation between a
tag and the reader resulting in the tag only accepting valid readers. In the case
of reader-authentication the adversary wins the game if the tag accepts a reader
in at least one protocol instance π for which there was no matching conversation.
Definition 3 (Mutual Authentication). Tag-authentication, as defined by Def. 2 is
extended to include that reader-authentication was achieved in the same session
before finishing tag-authentication.
3.3. Notation
Our proposed protocol is based on Elliptic Curve Cryptography, hence we make
use of additive notation. Points on the curve are represented by capital letters
while scalars are represented by lowercase letters.
In our protocol, we only make use of the x-coordinates of the points on the
curve, denoted by [·]x. Assuming an elliptic curve E with prime order ℓ over Fp,
then for a point Q = {qx, qy} with qx, qy ∈ [0 . . . p−1], [Q]x maps Q to qx mod ℓ.
4. Generic Construction
We only consider tag-privacy and not the reader’s. As such, any authentication
protocol (whether or not it is privacy-preserving) can be used for reader au-
thentication. However, we also need to provide the necessary binding between
reader authentication and the following tag authentication. How to link these
two uni-directional authentication instances is the most crucial design decision
for mutual authentication protocols. Our generic contruction makes use of a sig-
nature scheme, binding the reader’s request to some fresh randomness generated
by the tag. One of the most efficient signature schemes is the Schnorr signature
scheme [17], i.e. it only requires two scalar-EC point multiplications and a hash
function evaluation to verify a signature.
Our generic construction starts from a private RFID authentication protocol,
in which the reader challenges the tag to establish its identity. To authenticate
this query, the challenge from the reader together with some fresh randomness
from the tag (to guarantee freshness) is signed by the reader and sent back to
the tag together with the challenge. The tag can then verify the signature, es-
tablishing that the challenge came from the known reader. The additional effort
required from the tag, in comparison with the original private RFID authentica-
tion protocol, is verifying one signature. To illustrate our generic construction,
we transformed Vaudenay’s public key protocol [18] and Randomized Schnorr,
proposed by Bringer et al. [5].
4.1. Vaudenay’s Public Key Protocol
The reader has a public/private key pair (PK, pk). To verify that a tag with
identity ID registered, the reader checks the additional value K by applying its
secret key KM to the tag’s identity. At registration, the tag gets the value K from
the reader. For an IND-CCA2 cryptosystem, this protocol is wide-strong private.
Our generic construction prepends Vaudenay’s protocol with a message from
the tag to the reader, containing a random number that was generated by the
tag, to guarantee freshness. The reader signs its challenge concatenated with this
randomness and sends the challenge along with the signature to the tag. Upon
successful verification of the signature, the tag completes the protocol as in the
original. If the verification fails, the tag aborts. As such, the RFID tag does not
respond to unauthorised queries with identifiable information.
ID,K,PK
Tag T
pk,KM
Reader R
r ∈R Zℓ
r
a ∈R Zℓ
a, σ = signpk(r||a)
verifyPK(σ, r||a)
c = EncPK(ID||K||a)
˙ID||K˙||a˙ = Decpk(c)
a
?
= a˙, K˙
?
= FKM (
˙ID)
(a) Our generic construction
ID,K,PK
Tag T
pk,KM , DB : {IDi}
Reader R
a ∈R Zℓ
a
b ∈R Zℓ
c = EncPK(ID||K||a||b)
˙ID||K˙||a˙||b˙ = Decpk(c)
a
?
= a˙, K˙
?
= FKM (
˙ID)
b¯ = b˙ else b¯ ∈R Zℓ
b¯
b¯
?
= b
(b) Paise-Vaudenay [15]
Figure 1. Generic constructions to achieve mutual authentication applied to Vaudenay’s Public
Key Protocol[18].
Figure 1 depicts our enriched Vaudenay public key protocol as well as the
enriched version by Paise and Vaudenay [15], for which we will now illustrate the
differences between reader-first and tag-first mutual authentication.
The upside of the Paise-Vaudenay construction is efficiency, it does not require
the generation and verification of a signature. This is due to the fact that the
reader already knows the identity of the tag to authenticate to and hence can
authenticate very efficiently using shared information between the tag and reader.
The main downside of this approach is that attackers can still send arbritray
queries to the tag for which the tag sends responses, doing operations with the
secret that potentially leak information through side-channels. For the generic
construction, the adversary attacking the security and/or privacy of the tag is
restricted to using fresh, genuine queries from a genuine reader. Another downside
of the Paise-Vaudenay construction is the tag is expected to output whether or
not the protocol was succesful. For most RFID tags this assumption is unrealistic
as these have a very limited or even no output interface. This means that it is
impossible for a user to tell whether or not mutual authentication was successful.
Furthermore, in several use cases the reader will provide output indicating weather
or not tag authentication was succesful before the tag outputs the result. This
could be an additional point of attack for the adversary attack the tag’s privacy.
4.2. Randomized Schnorr
The reader has a public/private key pair (Y = yP, y) and the tag has a pub-
lic/private key pair (X = xP, x). The public keyX of the tag will serve as its iden-
tity and has been registered with the reader. This protocol is narrow-strong pri-
vate and secure against impersonation attacks (this security definition is weaker
than the one used in this paper, i.e. requiring matching conversations).
x, Y = yP
Tag T
y, DB : {Xi = xiP}
Reader R
r1, r2 ∈R Zℓ
R1 = r1P,R2 = r2Y
e ∈R Zℓ
e, σ = signy(R1, R2, e)
verifyY (σ,R1, R2, e)
s = ex+ r1 + r2
X˙ = e−1(sP−R1−y−1R2)
?
∈ DB
Figure 2. Our generic construction applied to Randomized Schnorr [5].
Figure 2 depicts our enriched Randomised Schnorr protocol. The original
Randomized Schnorr protocol is already a three pass protocol, in which, in the
first pass, the tag commits to fresh randomness. Using our generic construction,
we transform the protocol by having the reader put a signature on its exam
concatenated with the commitments from the tag. The resulting protocol also
achieves security under matching conversations and as such wide-forward privacy.1
This example clearly shows that by having reader-first mutual authentication the
privacy attacker’s capabilities can be reduced.
5. Our Protocol: IBIHOP
Instead of applying our generic construction to existing private RFID authentica-
tion protocols, one could also design a specific private RFID mutual authentica-
tion protocol that is more efficient. Towards our goal of optimising the available
circuit area, the use of a hash function should be avoided, if possible. In prac-
tice this also rules out signature schemes, as the message to be signed is hashed.
We propose a new mutual authentication wide-strong private protocol, IBIHOP,
that is shown in Fig. 3. IBIHOP is constructed by interleaving two interactive
authentication protocols, resulting in a four pass protocol.
x, Y = yP
Tag T
y, DB : {Xi = xiP}
Reader R
e ∈R Z
∗
ℓ
[E]x =
ˆ
e−1P
˜
x
r ∈R Z
∗
ℓ
[R]x = [rP ]x
f =
ˆ
[yR]
x
P
˜
x
+ e
e = f −
ˆ
[rY]
x
P
˜
x
eE
?
= P
s = ex+ r
X˙ = e−1(sP −R)
?
∈ DB
Figure 3. The IBIHOP protocol.
For reader authentication, the reader first commits to the exam. Second the
tag challenges the reader with R. To simplify our analysis we assume the reader
rejects simultaneous sessions at the reader side with an identical R. The reader
replies with f = [[yR]x P ]x+e. As such the reader showed knowledge of its private
key y, corresponding to its public key Y = yP given the CDH assumption. Only
the tag, using its knowledge of r, can extract the exam e = f − [[rY ]x P ]x and
verify it against the commitment E. As such reader-authentication is achieved at
the same time as providing the crucial coupling between the two authentication
instances. Note that e is selected in Z∗ℓ and cannot be zero, which is a necessary
condition to be able to compute its inverse e−1.
1This follows from Vaudenay’s lemma [18, Lemma 8] that states that any secure (matching
conversations) narrow-forward private protocol is wide-forward private.
For tag authentication we used the standard Schnorr identification protocol
(in which the tag proves knowledge of its private key x corresponding to its public
keyX = xP that also serves as identifier and has been registered with the reader),
with the exception that the exam e is not sent over in the clear, but only known
to the tag and the reader. The original Schnorr protocol has been proven secure
under the One More Discrete Logarithm (OMDL) assumption by Bellare and
Palacio [3]. Note that the tag selects r in Z∗ℓ . Having r = 0 would completly
destroy the security and privacy of the tag.
5.1. Security and Privacy Evaluation
We briefly sketch the general strategy to show the security and privacy properties
of the protocol:
• First, reader authentication is shown. The crucial property here is that an
adversary is unable to compute [[yR]x P ]x, which contains a CDH value,
and hence also cannot output a correct value for f .
• Next, we show (under the Oracle CDH and DL assumption) that when a tag
authenticates a reader there was a matching conversation for the first three
messages (E,R, f), i.e. that these were passed unmodified between tag
and reader. The OCDH assumption is essential to show that an adversary
cannot authenticate to the tag without calling the reader with the same R
as the tag sent out. This ensures that the value of R cannot be manipulated
and thus guarantees that both the reader and tag session are linked through
this message. Due to the ordering of messages this simplifies the analysis.
• Tag authentication can be shown by analogy to the Schnorr protocol. Since
e is used in the tag authentication and was passed unmodified from reader
to tag, mutual authentication is achieved.
• Finally, wide-strong privacy is shown under the Inverse DDH (IDDH)
assumption. When given an IDDH pair, this can be plugged into the
value E = e−1P and it’s (potential) inverse eP is used for computing
R = sP−(ex)P to make sure that tag authentication is satisfied. Obviously
when given a real IDDH instance a privacy adversary will function as re-
quired, when a random instance is given, the privacy adversary is working
on random data and has negligible advantage.
5.2. Optimising IBIHOP
The IBIHOP protocol requires roughly 4 scalar-EC point multiplications (ECPMs).
The optimised IBIHOP protocol can be obtained by modifying f , i.e. replacing
[[yR]x P ]x (marked in boldface in Fig. 3) with [yR]x. The optimised protocol re-
quires only 3 ECPMs on the tag, which we believe is the minimum for a mutual
authentication protocol that achieves such a high security and privacy level. The
extra [(·)P ]x in the original protocol assures that yR was properly protected using
a one-way function. However, this extra operation can be dropped since yR still
remains adequately protected because of the addition of e. An adversary only
obtains E = e−1P and f = e + [yR]x. In this sense, yR is still protected by a
one-way function, i.e. by the addition of the (unknown) discrete logarithm of E.
6. Hardware Implementation
Passive RFID tags are extremely resource-constrained devices. The tags draw
energy from the magnetic field established by the reader. The reading distance
is thus determined by two factors: the field strength, which is standardized, and
the power consumption of the tag. Therefore, tags have strict power budget such
that a reasonable reading distance is guaranteed. In addition, the area of the
implementation should be minimized to reduce its tape-out cost.
The IBIHOP protocol is optimized for lightweight implementations by de-
sign. The optimised IBIHOP protocol requires three ECPMs on the tag side.
Note that all the ECPMs can be performed without using the y-coordinate. Ex-
plicit formulae that use only x-coordinate exist for point multiplications on both
binary curves [12] and prime curves [8]. Using only x-coordinate speeds up the
point multiplication and meanwhile reduces the storage (e.g. memory or regis-
ter). Communication between the tag and reader is also reduced since only the
x-coordinate of E and R is transmitted. Less data transmission leads to a lower
power consumption and shorter execution time.
Lee et al. [11] reported a compact ECC processor for passive RFID tags. It
supports a binary elliptic curve defined over F2163 . The curve achieves about 80-
bit security. The processor uses an x-coordinate only point multiplication algo-
rithm. It also support integer additions and multiplications. The ECC processor
has an area of 15.4 kGates. Using the UMC 130nm process, the average power
consumption is only 12.08 µW at the frequency of 323 kHz.2 We use this proces-
sor as a platform to evaluate the execution time and energy consumption of the
optimized IBIHOP protocol.
Table 1. Execution time and storage for the optimized IBIHOP protocol (using the ECC pro-
cessor from Lee et al.)
Step Operation
Delay External Storage
[# cycle]
R = rP 1 ECPM 78,544 r, [E]x
[rY ]x 1 ECPM 78,544 r, [E]x, [rY ]x
e = f − [rY ]x Sub. 574 e, r, [E]x
T = eE 1 ECPM 78,544 e, r, [E]x
s = ex+ r Mul.+Add. 26,059 s
Total 262,265 163×3
Table 1 summarises the computation on the tag. The ECC processor uses
Montgomery powering ladder, and each iteration uses 7 multiplications, 4 squar-
ings and 3 additions in F2163 . An ECPM uses exactly 78,544 cycles. A modular
integer addition and multiplication uses 574 and 25,486 cycles, respectively. Note
that the IBIHOP protocol needs to keep some temporary variables. This is sum-
marized in Table 1 as well. When running at 323 kHz, the execution time for
the optimised IBIHOP protocol is finished in less than 0.82s. The total energy
2These are simulation results. See [11] for more details.
consumption will be less than 10 µJ . The chip can also be clocked at higher fre-
quency. For example, when running at 969kHz, the optimised IBIHOP protocol
requires 0.27s. The power consumption of the chip will be higher at this speed,
but it is still below 50 µW .
Unlike signature-based protocols, IBIHOP does not use hash functions, which
saves silicon area for hardware implementation. The smallest SHA-1 implemen-
tation [14] uses 5527 gates. When packing the SHA-1 module together with ECC
processor, the area cost of SHA-1 will be smaller since memory and some logic unit
are shared. Even though, the area cost due to the hash function is not negligible
since the total area of an ECC implementation is already very small.
Note that cryptographic implementations also face side-channel attacks and
fault attacks. The ECC processor by Lee et al. deploys the Montgomery power-
ing ladder, which resists against simple power analysis, and random projective
coordinates, which resists against differential power analysis. In fact, the IBIHOP
protocol is less vulnerable to physical attacks since the secret, x, is only used after
a successful reader authentication. In other words, the attacker must possesses a
legitimate reader in order to take useful side-channel measurements.
7. Conclusions
With mutual authentication protocols, the main issue of RFID tags responding
to any query can be solved. However, one needs to bear in mind that this is only
the case for mutual authentication protocols where the reader authenticates first
to the tag. As a result the attacker’s power towards interacting with the tag is
reduced, and this for attackers against tag-security as well tag-privacy.
We put forward a proper definition of mutual authentication for RFID tags
and show how to enhance existing private RFID authentication protocols with
mutual authentication, according to this definition, in the form of a generic con-
struction. Furthermore we also proposed a new provably wide-strong private RFID
mutual authentication protocol, IBIHOP, which is very efficient as it only requires
3 scalar-EC point multiplications. Towards implementation, the protocol does not
require additional cryptographic building blocks to be implemented in hardware
(saving circuit area) and can be further optimised by only using the x-coordinates
of the elliptic curve points (saving in computation and communication). As an
added benefit, the resulting implementation provides higher resistance against
side-channel analysis.
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